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Abstract- The authentication of broadcast sources is one of the most important 
research issues in the area of network security. To confirm that the control 
information received is from the genuine management nodes, the message 
broadcasted from management nodes must be verifiable for the working nodes. In 
this paper, a highly reliable WSN broadcast authentication protocol based-on 
one-way key chain, namely, the ESKA, is presented. For the purpose of 
comparison, a group of simulations are conducted. The results have demonstrated 
that compared with µTESLA, the presented method is of lower authentication delay 
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and higher authentication rate in large broadcast data traffic transmission, 
meanwhile reducing considerable communication overheads in those applications. 
Index terms: Broadcast Authentication Protocol, µTESLA, ESKA, High Reliability, 
One-way Key Chain. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sensor nodes are usually deployed in complex environments, and they are 
prone to be affected by external factors including human factors [1]. 
Meanwhile, nodes failure and many other factors may lead to the change of 
network topology [2]. Any kinds of secure issues of WSN may undermine the 
reliability of WSN applications, e.g., the commercial wireless security network 
in districts, monitoring the WSN deployment in enemy-occupied area for 
military use [3]. Traditional security mechanisms and protocols do not take the 
nods’ characteristic into consideration, therefore they cannot be applied in 
WSN directly. Taking into account that the nodes in WSN are limited in 
computing speed, power supply, communication and message storage, it is 
demanded to design a robust security mechanism which can provide 
appropriate services and protect the WSN from malicious attack [4, 5]. 
Authentication is one of the principal security services in WSN, which aims to 
certify identity of nodes and correctness of messages from the source nodes. 
Many security services are based on the authentication issues [6]. In WSN, 
there are two kinds of authentication issues, including P2P authentication and 
broadcast authentication. P2P authentication is designed for certifying the 
communication between two points. Being different, broadcast authentication 
is an authentication for one node to multi-nodes. The traditional P2P 
authentication uses symmetric encryption technology to certify the message 
source:  both sides communicate with each other by using the shared key to 
encrypt the messages. The source authentication of broadcast communicating 
cannot use the same mechanism, as any nodes within the network can imitate 
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the source node and send ciphertext [7]. Once any potential attacker obtained 
the shared key from certain node, the security of the broadcast authentication 
mechanism would be broken. By contrast, it would be better to choose the 
asymmetric encryption, which is a digital signature algorithm based on the 
public key mechanism. The sensor nodes are limited in computing speed, 
power supply, communication and message storage, traditional digital 
signature algorithms based on public key mechanism is not suitable for WSN, 
hence a novel broadcast authentication mechanism for WSN is demanded. 
II. Related Work 
There are many research challenges for WSN [8]. A suitable security 
protection mechanism is demanded to ensure that the communication in 
network. One of the many requirements is security according to the 
characteristic of WSN [9, 10, 11]. The protocol SPINS is one of WSN security 
framework. For the limited resources and the optimal architecture of wireless 
communication, there are two secure modules of SPINS, namely, the SNEP 
and the µTESLA [12]. The former one outlines a very important basic security 
principle: data confidentiality, double sides’ data authentication, the freshness 
of the data and P2P authentication. The µTESLA could use broadcast 
authentication in WSN with strictly limited resources. 
In Figure 1, the µTESLA broadcast authentication process is illustrated. The 
broadcast nodes broadcast packages P1~P6 and release 4 keys Ki-1~Ki+2 in 4 
key cycles. The nodes will check packages’ time information after they receive 
packages P1 and P2, then determine that two packages’ broadcast keys do not 
release, So P1 and P2 will be stored by sensors. The sensor nodes save the time 
information when the key will be released, and will receive the key 
information at the right time. After receiving key Ki, the nodes will calculate 
F(Ki) and check that whether F(Ki) is consistent with Ki-1. If not, the nodes 
will drop the key. Otherwise, the key will be considered to be legal. After 
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receiving the legal key, the nodes will use Ki to authenticate P1 and P2 
receiving in [Ti, Ti+Tint] according to the time scale. 
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Figure 1.  Broadcast authentication process of µTESLA 
If the node dropped the released key Ki+1, it can certify P3 after receiving the 
next broadcast key Ki+2 that is the key certifying [Ti+2, Ti+2+Tint]. Due to the 
loss of Ki+1, the nodes can judge the key by comparing that if F
(2)
(Ki+2) and Ki 
is equal. If it is legal, then it needs to calculate Ki+1= F
(1)
(Ki+2), and use Ki+1 to 
certify P3, use Ki+2 to certify P4 and P5. 
The µTESLA tackles some problems in broadcast authentication such as: 
1) Shares the network key, 
2) Generates one-way of the key chain, 
3) Releases the lost key packages, 
4) Delay key’s releasing, 
5) Authenticate and initiate the key. 
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The drawback of the µTESLA lies in that the authentication delay may bring 
about DoS attack in the cycle of distributing parameters. 
III. The Broadcast Authentication Scheme ESKA 
Traditional authentication schemes usually adopt asymmetric key to carry out 
authentication, such as RSA, DSA and so on, but those schemes require large 
memory for message storage, which may cause more energy consuming [13]. 
As a result, those schemes are not suitable for WSN [14]. Although in some 
relative works, it was suggested that the elliptic curve key algorithm which has 
shorter key message and less calculating process can be used for WSN to carry 
out authentication, but the memory and energy consuming is still too large for 
real WSN applications [15, 16]. This paper adopts symmetric encryption 
algorithm to carry out broadcast authentication in WSN [17]. ESKA is based 
on the following assumptions [18]: 
1) The base station is of strong calculating capability, large memory and well 
protected, 
2) The nodes of WSN can communicate with the base station either directly 
or indirectly, 
3) Before deployed in WSN, the nodes have stored the Hash algorithm codes, 
initial key and other information. 
a. System initialization 
The packages’ form used by base station to carry out broadcast authentication 
is as table 1. Hd represents the header of signature package, which has source 
address, package’s length, and destination address. 
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Table 1: Signature packages’ form of base station 
Form Explanation 
Src source address 
Len package’s length 
Dst destination address 
Cmd current packet type 
Rnd signature round number 
Ctr Timer 
Data valid data 
Mac Signature 
a.i  The generation of key chain 
The base station saves shared one-way Hash function by the whole network 
before the network is deployed, then generates the key chain with the key 
generating algorithm [19]. The generation of key chain is based on one-way 
function, MD5 is used. MD5 is a classical Hash algorithm, it can deal with any 
message and then get the 128bit key. It is suitable for WSN in security and 
calculating cost. 
The first key '0K of the key chain is generated randomly, then the p+1 key
 ''2'1'0 ,...,, pKKKK by the following key generating process. 
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The process of the base station using the key chain is opposite process of the 
generating of the key chain, which can be written down L={K0, K1, K2, … , 
Kp}, where K0=F(K1). 
a.ii  The release of initial key 
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At the beginning, nodes need to join in WSN. First they must register in base 
station, and get the necessary security information. The process is as follow: 
(2)    )Re||||,(||Re||||:  ...... qNIDKMACqNIDBSA AAauAA  
 (3)   )D||(||,,)D||(: 00  ...... KIKNKMACKIKABS enAAauenA  
A is the sensor node, BS is the base station, NA is a random number that can 
carry out strong refresh authentication. Req is the package that requests to join 
in the WSN. BS once receives packages with Req, it must copy the node’s 
information. Kau is the authentication key between A and S. K0 is the initial 
key, and also the first key information of the Hash chain. Kau is the 
authentication key between A and BS, Ken is the encryption key between A 
and BS when they carry out communication. They both generate the shared 
key information: 
(4)     )()1( ......KFK starten   
(5)     )()2( ......KFK startau   
With the above steps, the sensor node receives the first key K0 in one-way key 
chain. Then when BS releases the K1, it can calculate F(K1) to distinguish the 
released key by checking whether F(K1) is equal to K0. The base station 
signature and the sensors authentication will be safe. 
b. Broadcast signature and authentication 
The base station sends control information to sensor nodes in the way of 
broadcasting packages [20]. The ESKA is based on one-way key chain 
broadcast authentication algorithm, which core part is to solve the base station 
signature and nodes certifying. 
b.i  The BS signature and the key transmit 
The base station sends broadcast packages MA1 to sensor A: 
(6)     }||||||nd||||{ 11 ......MacDataCtrRCmdHM AdA   
(7)     ata)||tr||nd||||||,(1 ......DCRCmdHKMacMac djA   
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The Figure 2 shows the process of sending the base station’s signature 
packages. The base station node and sensor nodes have the same buffer 
packet’s threshold R. When the size of data packet reach the threshold, the 
base station will consider that it has already reached the max number of buffer 
packets, then it will broadcast the key packets regardless of whether the time 
slot is T. 
The process of the algorithm of broadcasting key packets: 
Step 1: The base station checks that whether there exist packets to be sent. If 
exist, it will send the packets, then generate iMAC  with encryption. 
(8)   }||{   ......MACMMsg ii  
(9)   }||||||||{  ......DataCtrRndCmdHM di   
After processing, the base station will broadcast it to sensor nodes, the counter 
will increase 1. If not, it will turn to step 3; 
Step 2: The base station judges whether the signature packet’s counter is 
greater than threshold R, if it has reached the threshold R, which means that 
the node has reached its limit for caching the signature packet and can no 
longer cache signature package. At this time, base station node will broadcast 
key packets to help the sensor nodes certify the received signature data packet 
and then set counter Num and timer zero. Turn to step 1. Or, turn to step 3; 
Step 3: Check whether the timer has reached the moment key is released. If 
not, turn to step 1; 
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Figure 2.  Signature packets and key packets from base station 
 
Step 4: If it has reached time T, the base station node will check whether the 
signature packet counter Num is greater than zero. If, it means that it is not 
broadcasting the signature packet in last period. It is no significant to 
broadcast key packet. At this time, the base station node will not release the 
key packet information, but set the timer zero (re-timing), then postpone the 
release of next authentication key; 
Step 5: If Num is greater than zero, which means that the base station node 
broadcasts the signature packet in the last period. At this time, base station 
broadcasts key packet, and clears the signature packet counter Num and the 
timer T, turn to Step 1. 
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Figure 3.  Process of broadcasting signature packets and key distribution 
Figure 3 is the process of broadcasting signature packets and sending key. At 
Tj+1 moment, sensor nodes receive the key information Kj. It will calculate 
F(Kj) first, then compared with Kj-1. If equal, the key is a legitimate key, 
otherwise drop the key package. After receiving valid key Kj, nodes will find 
the cached data packets which use signature of this key information according 
to Rnd in the packet. The entire life cycle of the base station is divided into 
some time slices. In each slice the base station will use the key in one-way key 
chain to sign data packet in the corresponding period. Generating the sequence 
of key and releasing the key chain are opposite. 
b.ii  Packet caching and digital signature authentication 
After node receiving the signature packet from the base station, it will deal 
with data packets differently according to Cmd and Rnd. When generating the 
packet signature, it will use symmetric encryption algorithm RC5. RC5 is a 
simple and efficient algorithm, and it is suitable for hardware and software 
implementations, it is also a customizable encryption algorithm. The sensor 
nodes can choose different parameters to carry out cryptographic operations, 
which is very flexible. 
When receiving signature packet Packet1, the node must firstly check whether 
the packet is the base station broadcast packets or forged by the attacker. Cmd 
and Rnd from the packet and then checks whether the Cmd is in the set of 
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Cmd commands, Rnd is in reasonable range. If any one is not in the correct 
range, it indicates that the packet is forged or maybe mistakes occurred in 
sending, followed by dropping of the packet. Otherwise, the node will 
continue to check wheterh Ctr is correct or not. 
It can check the packets’ freshness by counter Ctr. Ctr corresponds to an 
increment counter in the base station node. The counter will plus 1 when 
sending a data packet. The sensor nodes should check whether the Ctr is 
greater than Ctr the last received packet. If Ctr Ctr  is wrong, drop the 
packet. Then the base station judges data packet type of Cmd, and fulfills 
corresponding operations. 
If the packet received by the base station node is key releasing packet, base 
station node will begin the certification process of the packet. The sensor node 
will take out Rndi and Kj from key released package, and finds the data packet 
include Rndi. Each data packet collected in the data package set will be 
certified using the Ki. Then the sensor node certifies Rndi-1. 
The base station node and sensor node have same packet buffer threshold R, 
all the sensor nodes will not receive more data than the threshold R package. If 
the number of the received packet is more than this number, then the node can 
judge that they have already suffered DOS attack. 
c. The refresh of the key chain and new node joining in 
c.i  The refresh of one-way key chain 
In initialization, the base station node generates a key chain 0L {K ,  K ,  K ,...K }p 1 2 . 
If the key chain is depleted in the life cycle of the base station, broadcast 
signature and certification process will not continue, so the base station need 
to generate new key chain to continue this signature certification process.  
Base station generates a new key chain which can not be used immediately. 
The sensor nodes will check the received key information and judge its 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 6, NO. 4, SEPTEMBER 2013 
1663
legality. If i 1( )F K   is not equal to Ki, the sensor node will consider that this is 
a fake key release packet and drop it, the entire certification process will be 
interrupted. The paper designed a mechanism which uses the already existing 
chain tail key to certify the chain head of the new key chain. 
When the base station node find that key in the one-way key chain has only KP 
and KP-1, it will generate a new key chain. First of all the base station will use 
one-way key chain generation algorithm described above to generate new key 
chain  ''2'1'0' ,...,,, pKKKKL  . Then the base station sends 0K to sensor nodes. 
The node updates its own key information after confirming the signature 
packet from base station. 
The base station node generates a new key chain and broadcast key update 
message to others.  
(10)   }ac||'||||||||{ 131  ......MKCtrRndCmdHMsg id
 
(11)   }'||||||||,{ 31-1  ......KCtrRndCmdHKMacMac idp
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Figure 4.  Key chain update 
'
0K  is the first key of the new key chain, the message use Kp-1 to carry out 
signature. Sensor nodes use the Cmd to judge that if this news is the key chain 
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update message. If the news is, sensor node will cache message and wait for 
the base station broadcast to release key packets. Sensor node receives a key 
release message Msg2. 
(12)   }ac||||||||||{ 21-22  ......MKCtrRndCmdHMsg pid  
(13)   }||||||||,{ 1-22  ......KCtrRndCmdHKMacMac pidp  
By comparing F(Kp-1) with the last authentication key KP-2 , the node judges 
whether Kp-1 is a legitimate key. If it is, the node can certify Msg1. 
'
0K  is the 
new key when Msg1 is legal. 
c.ii  New node authentication 
When a new node requests to join in WSN, it needs to register to the base 
station node and declare its own existence, and obtain the relevant parameters 
information of the sensor network, including the authentication key. 
First the new node must have preset the one-way hash function h=F() and 
public key information Kstart. 
Step 1: The node first calculates the encryption key and authentication key, the 
process is as formula 4 and formula 5; 
Step 2: To join in WSN, the node sends key request information to the base 
station. The packet message is as follow: 
(14)   )}||D||Re,(||||||D||Re{Re Anew  ......NIqKMACCtrNIqqmes AauA  
Where Req represents data’s type, and IDnew is the node’s ID information, NA 
is used to achieve the strong refresh authentication. 
Step 3: The node monitors the base station that whether it sends the Req 
response packets. If not, the node will wait for 2s to re-send the key request 
package msgReq. 
Step 4: If the node receives the response packets from the base station： 
(15)   )})D||(||,(||||)D||{( newnew  ......KIKNKMACCtrKIKmessage eniAaueni
The node will carry out broadcast authentication to the received data packets. 
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If authentication fails, drop the package. The node waits for 2s to re-send 
msgReq message to the base station node to request the key information. 
Step5: If the authentication is successful, the new node will register at the base 
station successfully. The node needs to save the key Ki in the response packet. 
IV. Simulation 
In this paper, Matlab7.0 is adopted to conduct simulations and compare the 
performance of µTESLA with the proposed ESKA. The simulation results 
show that ESKA is of lower authentication delay and higher authentication 
rate in lager broadcast data traffic transmission, and overheads in those 
applications are reduced. 
a. Simulation parameters 
It sets the same stimulation scene to µTESLA and ESKA. The stimulation 
parameters are as following Table 2. 
Table 2: Simulation parameters 
Form Explanation 
(0,0) to (100,100) nodes random distribution area  
(xBS,yBS)=(50,75) Coordinates of the base station BS 
nn=101 Number of nodes 
Emax=2.5J Node’s initial energy 
Data Packet’s size 500Bytes 
Eelec=50nJ/bit Energy consumption for wireless 
communication  
Stop=360s Maximum simulation run time  
 
The distributed nodes are shown as in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Nodes distribution 
b. Simulation analysis 
The stimulation experiment compares µTESLA and ESKA in the following 
aspects: power consumption, authentication rate, authentication delay and 
packet loss rate. 
b.i  Power consumption 
Figure 6 is energy consumption of the ESKA and the µTESLA with 100s 
simulation time and key release cycle T = 1s. ESKA consumes less power than 
µTESLA in the entire simulation cycle. With the base station signature data 
traffic increasing, the gap between the ESKA and µTESLA on the energy 
consumption is increasingly smaller. The broadcast authentication scheme 
ESKA release key packet depends not only on time. When the signature 
packet traffic is small, the base station will first check whether it sends 
signature package in last key cycle. If yes, the base station will broadcast key 
packet; if not, key package will be postponed release until the next key 
sending cycle, which saves energy by reducing unnecessary keys release. 
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Figure 6.  Energy consumption of ESKA and µTESLA 
Authentication Rate 
The certification rate is the ratio of the sensor node successfully authenticating 
signature packets and the base station sending signature packets. Figure 7 
shows the authentication rate of ESKA and µTESLA in 250s and T=2s. 
 
Figure 7.  Authentication rate of ESKA and µTESLA 
When the threshold value R=8, the ESKA is able to fully certified the 
signature data packets of base station broadcasted, while the certification rate 
of µTESLA is decreasing with broadcast traffic of base station increasing. 
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When R=6, the µTESLA curve declines faster than R=8. Broadcasting the 
same signature packet of base station, certification rate is low when R=6. In 
sensor networks with less storage capacity, the network authentication rate of 
µTESLA will be lower with signature packets’ increasing of base station 
broadcasting. 
b.ii  Authentication delay 
The authentication delay is the length of time from the packet arriving at 
sensor node to be successfully certificated. Figure 8 is the authentication delay 
of ESKA and µTESLA. 
 
Figure 8.  the authentication delay of ESKA and µTESLA with 60s and T=1s 
Sensor node can only cache up to 8 signature packets in one network operating 
cycle. The node can only cache up to 480 signature packages in 60s. When the 
broadcast traffic exceeds this value, the sensor node using µTESLA protocol 
will cause the loss of broadcast signature packets because of insufficient cache 
space. The signature packets received will be certified until key cycle T 
arrives. When base station broadcasting signature packets is over 480, ESKA 
will release key packets before key cycle T arriving. With broadcast traffic 
increasing, the base station will use broadcast signature pack’s threshold R as 
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the condition to release key, so the certification delay will decrease with the 
increase of traffic. When R=6, the ESKA will release key packets before the 
signature packets’ number is more than 360, the certification delay will 
decrease with the increase of traffic and is less than R=8. 
b.iii   Packet Rate 
Packet loss rate is defined as the ratio failed signature packages to the 
signature packets base station broadcasting and sending. The figure 9 shows 
packet loss rates of ESKA and µTESLA in 150s and T=2s. 
 
Figure 9. Packet loss rates of ESKA and µTESLA 
When threshold R=10, the packet loss rate of ESKA is zero, which because 
ESKA takes sensor nodes’ buffer capacity of signature packets into account. 
The base station will broadcast immediately authentication key packets when 
data packets sent over the threshold R in a key release cycle. Sensor nodes can 
certify these signature packages and release the buffer space. But µTESLA 
does not take the matter that the traffic will affect the sensor nodes caching the 
signature packets into account. Packet loss rate will always increase along 
with the increase of network traffic. When the threshold R=8, the packet loss 
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rate of µTESLA is higher than R=6, which means that µTESLA has serious 
loss packet rate in smaller network with limit buffer capacity. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As one of the most principal security services for wireless sensor networks, 
broadcast authentication was discussed in this paper. Broadcast authentication 
is of great significance in promoting the popularity of WSN applications. To 
satisfy demands from wireless sensor network for broadcast authentication, 
this paper presented a novel broadcast authentication scheme based on 
one-way key chain, namely the ESKA. The presented ESKA is basically an 
asymmetric authentication method which uses the one-way key chain and the 
delay in releasing the key to perform asymmetric authentication. The 
algorithm was presented in detail, the authentication rate was increased by 
adjusting the key release packet interval dynamically according to the 
broadcast traffic in the network. Meanwhile, the network is prevented from 
releasing the key packet in no broadcast packet and thus nodes’ energy 
consumption is reduced. A group of simulations are conducted and the results 
of the presented method are compared to existing method such as µTESLA. 
The results had demonstrated that the proposed ESKA requires less 
communication and computation, and is capable to resist the replay attack and 
DoS attack, without need for time synchronization. 
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